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Basing accountant's liability on the contemplated use of an audit rather
than a consensual relationship will increase the cost of liability insu-
rance. However, this added expense will be passed on to the business
community in the form of higher fees. The corporation will in turn
either pass on the cost to consumers, or the stockholder will receive a
smaller dividend. The end result will be greater protection to the public
served by the accounting profession.
Conclusion
Rusch Factors v. Levin established a reasonable basis for account-
ant's liability; the contemplated use of the audit known by the accountant.
This case recognized the independent audit as the primary source of
reliable information to the investor. The decision is justified in light of
the professional standard of the accountant and the fact that a duty
standard based on a consensual relationship is no longer applicable to
negligence cases. It is submitted that these factors justify an abrogation
of the privity requirement established in Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche, and an expansion of the accountant's liability to third parties
for negligence premised on the contemplated use of the audit known to
the accountant when preparing his report.
ARNOLD P. ANDERSON
Federal Taxation-Income in Respect of a Decedent-Discount
Notes: In the case of Levin v. United States,' the First Circuit Court
of Appeals considered several questions in the area of federal estate
and income taxation. In the Levin case, an action was brought by
an executrix to recover an alleged overpayment of income tax by
the estate. Since the actual facts involved in the controversy were
quite complicated, the court adopted a simplified example in order
to better illustrate the legal principles involved.
In the hypothetical transaction adopted by the court, the dece-
dent had lent $8,000 in return for a four-year note having a face
value of $10,000 and an interest rate of 6%. The $2,000 difference
between the amount advanced and the face value of the note was
designated "discount income." In reporting his taxable income, the
decedent had employed the cash method of accounting. Thus, as he
received payments on the face (i.e., excluding the 6% interest) he
allocated 80% to principal and 20% to "discount income." For his
own records he had used the accrual method of accounting and had
recorded the discount in equal installments each year, regardless
of whether the entire amount was paid. At the time of the decedent's
death (two years after the note had been executed), he had been
ANALYSIS SERvIcE, Accountant's Professional Liability Policy (§ 273.1), pub-
lished by Rough Notes Co. Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana (July 1968).
'Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434 (1st Cir. 1967).
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paid $4,000. Thus, in reporting for tax purposes, $3,200 had been
allocated to principal and $800 to "discount income."
Following the death of the decedent, the executrix valued the
note at $5,580 for federal estate purposes and paid estate taxes
based on that valuation. Thereafter, the note was paid in full to the
estate and the executrix then filed a federal income tax return and
reported $1,200 as income in respect of a decedent, taxable to the
estate under section 691(a) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code.2
Later, the executrix brought an action for a refund claiming that
she should have reported only $200 as income in respect of a dece-
dent.
The district court 3 ruled that the original return filed by the
executrix had been correct and that the estate was therefore not
entitled to a refund. On appeal, however, the First Circuit vacated
the judgment and remanded the case.,
In so doing, the court considered several issues of importance,
the first of which dealt with the value at which the note should
have been reported on the federal estate tax return. According to
Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code 4 "the value of the gross
estate of the decedent shall be determined by including . . . the
value at the time of his death of all property. . . ." The situation in
the Levin case posed a problem in that there was no quoted market
value for the note involved. Therefore, the executrix, in order to
arrive at the fair market value of the note, projected the total amount
to be received, and discounted it at what she thought to be an ac-
ceptable rate of compensation for the postponement of receipt. As
a result of the rate at which the ostensible face value ($6,000) of the
note was discounted, its fair market value ($5,580) exceeded the
amount of unpaid principal (i.e., $4,800). The executrix had, in
effect, asserted that the note was of an extremely safe character, had
an unusually high present value and that a purchaser of the note
would therefore be willing to pay more than the amount of unpaid
principal.
The court did not decide whether such a valuation of the note
was accurate for federal estate tax purposes because the govern-
ment never contested the reasonablenss of the figure used in com-
puting that tax. It is apparent that the government had not done so,
because by allowing this fair market value estimate rather than the
figure representing unpaid principal, a higher estate tax had been
received.
Government acceptance of this figure on the estate tax return
2 INT. Ray. CODE of 1954, § 691(a) (1) (A).
3 Levin v. United States, 254 F. Supp. 640 (D. Mass. 1966).
4 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2031 (a).
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gave rise to the second major issue treated by the court. This issue
dealt with whether the above figure then became the basis to be
used for federal income tax reporting. The executrix argued that
it should, but the government, which had allowed the unusually
large figure to be used on the estate tax return, disagreed.
The answer to this question seems to be given in section 1.014-3
of the Treasury Regulations 5 which states that "the value of prop-
erty as of the date of the decedent's death as appraised for the pur-
pose of federal estate tax . . . shall be deemed to be its fair market
value" and according to section 1014 (a) of the Internal Revenue
Code6 is to be used as the basis when filing an inome tax return.
The answer, however, has not always been so definite, for al-
though the generally accepted interpretation of section 1.014-3(a)
of the Regulations gives the estate tax valuation prima facie weight,
the conclusiveness of the valuation has frequently been rebutted by
both taxpayers and the government.7 When the Levin case was
originally decided by the district court, it was ruled that ". . . de-
terminations of value for estate tax purposes are not conclusive as
to the value for income tax purposes." The court, after stating that
this was particularly true where income in respect of a decedent
was involved, gave no other reason for not allowing the estate tax
valuation to be used. On appeal, however, the court decided that
"... the value declared and accepted on the estate tax return pre-
sumptively establishes the value under section 1014. ' s The court
further stated that the presumption had not been overcome since
there was no other evidence as to the fair market value of the note.
Because of this presumption by the court, the significance of
the valuation on the estate tax return can readily be seen: as the
value of the note (as reported on the estate tax return) is increased,
the federal income tax which must later be paid on it is decreased.
However, it is obvious that as the value at which the note is as-
sessed is increased, the estate tax due thereon will also increase.
Thus, it appears that any decision by the executor as to the valu-
ation of such note should include a consideration of the size of the
estate and the applicable tax rates to be used on both the estate and
income tax returns.
The final and major issue in the Levin case concerned income in
respect of a decedent, an item which may cause serious income tax
consequences. In Lein, the district court ruled that the entire $1,200
5 Treas. Reg. §1.014-3.
6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
7 See Recent Decision, Federal Income Taxation: Relation of Estate Tax Vali-
ation to Income Tax Basis, 44 MARQ. L. REv. 384 (1960-61) for citations and
discussion of this problem.8 Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434, 438 (1st Cir. 1967).
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originally reported as income in respect of a decedent had been re-
ported correctly and hence the estate was not entitled to a refund.
The First Circuit, however, ruled that only the discount actually
earned prior to decedent's death ($200) and not the unearned dis-
count ($1,000) constituted income in respect of a decedent. This
ruling by the circuit court changed the note's basis which was to be
used on the federal income tax return and in turn entitled the
estate to a refund.
In demonstrating how this ruling affected the note's basis, the
general rule as found in 1014(a) of the Internal Revenue Code9 must
first be examined. Under this section the basis of property in the
hands of a person (or estate) acquiring it from the decedent is its
fair market value at the time of the decedent's death. "This means
that any unrealized appreciation in property left by a decedent will
escape income taxation on the amount by which the fair market
value of the property at the date of the decedent's death exceeds the
basis of the property in the hands of the decedent." 10 However,
section 1015(c)" provides that the above rule does not apply to
items which constitute income in respect of a decedent. Thus these
items receive no stepped-up basis and are taxed as income even
though they are taxed at fair market value on the estate tax return.
To reduce the impact of double taxation on such items Section
691(c) 12 provides a deduction on the income tax return for the
amount of estate tax attributable to the inclusion of such items in
the gross estate.
In reporting income in respect of a decedent on the federal in-
come tax return, proper procedure calls for reducing the basis ($5,-
580) of the note by the amount representing income in respect of
a decedent ($200). By originally subtracting the entire $1,200 from
the fair market value of the note, the executrix had caused the basis
to be understated, and thus the overpayment of income tax by the
estate had resulted.
Unfortunately, the rules for determining what is income in re-
spect of a decedent are not as clear as the above procedure to be
followed once the amount of such item has been determined; for
while the Treasury Regulations specifically state how to report in-
come in respect of a decedent, they do not give a particularly re-
vealing definition thereof.
In order to better understand the definition set forth in the
Treasury Regulations 13 it is appropriate to review the historical
9 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(a).
10 Davison v. United States, 292 F.2d 937, 940 (Ct. CI. 1961).
11 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1014(c).
12 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 691 (c).
13 Treas. Reg. § 1.691 (a) -1 (b).
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material leading to its adoption. To do so one must go back to
1934. Prior to that time, money earned by a cash-basis taxpayer
and accruable to him on the date of his death escaped taxation if it
was still uncollected at the date of his death. The theory was that
"... at the time of the taxpayer's death these income items became
'corpus' which passed to his estate and, when later reduced to cash,
constituted a mere conversion of capital into a different form."' 4
Thus, the cash-basis taxpayer paid tax only on that amount which
had actually been collected prior to his death. At the same time an
accrual taxpayer paid income tax both on what he had received
and on what had accrued to him at the date of his death. This ob-
viously put the taxpayer employing the cash method at a disad-
vantage and at the same time resulted in loss of tax revenue to the
government.
Section 42 of the 1934 Revenue Act,15 which was aimed at
remedying this situation, provided that the last return of the dece-
dent was to include amounts "accrued up to the time of his death."
It should be noted that the term "accrued," as interpreted at this
time, was used in its strict accounting sense of actually having been
earned.
Although the 1934 Revenue Act seemingly effected equality be-
tween the cash and accrual methods of accounting, it often resulted
in hardship for the cash-basis taxpayer. The reason for this was that
Section 42 often resulted in a bunching of large amounts of income
in decedent's final return, thus subjecting these amounts to a higher
tax rate than had they been spread over a number of years.
The inequities of Section 42 were dealt with in 1942 by the pass-
age of Section 126.16 The effect of this amendment was to make all
payments not received before death taxable when received either by
the estate or by the person to whom the right to the amount passed.
Section 69117 is the successor of Section 12618 but makes very
few changes. It is the legislature's current attempt to resolve "...
sharp conflict between the notion that income should not escape
taxation merely because of the death of its producer, and the con-
cept that 'property' should receive a basis equal to its fair market
value on the date of the owner's death." 9
In Treasury Regulation 1.691 income in respect of a decedent
has been defined as "amounts to which a decedent was entitled
14 Ferrari, Income in Respect of a Decedent: Deductions, Capital Gains, and
Double Deductions, 3 N.Y.U. 23RD INsT. ON FED. TAX. 1209, 1210 (1965).
15 Revenue Act of 1934, § 42.
16 INT. REv. CODE Of 1939, § 126.
1" INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 691.
1S INT. REv. CODE Of 1939, § 126.
19 Ferrari, supra note 14 at 1222.
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as gross income but which were not properly includible in computing
his taxable income for the taxable year ending with the date of his
death or for a previous taxable year under the method of accounting
employed by the decedent. ' 20 (emphasis added).
The difficulty under this definition is twofold. The first diffi-
culty is in determining what the decedent has to have done prior
to his death in order to have "entitled" himself to income. It should
be noted that "entitled" is definitely not synonymous with the
meaning ordinarily attributed to the term "accrued." In fact, the
commissioner's choice of the term "entitled" appears to be due to
the judicial expansion process which the term "accrued" has under-
gone since it was originally used in Section 42 of the'1934 act.
In light of this judicial expansion, no short formulae can be
given for determining when one is "entitled" to income in respect
of a decedent. Instead, the courts have proceeded on a case-by-case
basis. All cases, however, have consistently held that in order for
an amount to be deemed "income in respect of a decedent" it is
necessary that such amount have been the result of activities of the
decedent duiring his lifetime.
The second problem under the definition is in determining when
the decedent is entitled to the amount as gross income (rather than
as property) and it is in regard to this problem that the Levin case
is of significance.
Before examining Levin's significance in respect to this problem,
it might be valuable to re-examine what difference it makes whether
an item passes as property rather than as income. If an item is
deemed to pass as property there can be no "income in respect of a
decedent" on which an income tax can be levied. There may, how-
ever, be "ordinary income" to the person who took from the dece-
dent when such person disposes of the property. At that time any
amount received in excess of the property's value, as of the date of
decedent's death, will be subject to taxation.
Due to Section 1014 of the Internal Revenue Code, it will almost
always be to the taxpayer's advantage to pay income tax on "ordi-
nary income" rather than on "income in respect of a decedent." Be-
cause of the stepped-up basis provision in that section, the amount
of "ordinary income" will always be tess than the amount of "in-
come in respect of a decedent."
However, in limited circumstances it may be to the taxpayer's
advantage to establish that an item passes to him as income (rather
than as property) since in so establishing he is entitled to deduc-
tions under Section 691.
2 0 Treas. Reg. § 1.691 (a)-1 (b).
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In Levin it will be recalled that the First Circuit ruled that only
the $200 accruing prior to the decedent's death passed as income (i.e.,
was income in respect of a decedent) and that the amount accruing after
his death passed to his estate as property. In ruling that only the amount
accruing before death constituted income in respect of a decedent,
the court stated that income in respect of a decedent ". . . does not in-
clude payments in the nature of return after the date of death on
property passing to the estate .... -21
Standing by itself, this statement cannot be disputed (1) be-
cause property passing to the estate is not income to the estate and
cannot be subjected to an income tax, and ,(2) because the income
realized on the property held by the estate is "ordinary income" to
the estate, not "income in respect of a decedent."
However, the statement of the court seems to assume its own
conclusions (i.e., that the $1,000 passes as property). The basis for
such assumption is unclear in that the court gave no explanation
for this statement and cited only two authorities in support thereof:
a sentence, which it-admitted is dictum, from a Second Circuit case ;22
and a Revenue Ruling 23 which is subject to the same criticism as
the Levin case.
As previously stated, all courts have consistently held that be-
fore an item will be deemed to constitute "income in respect of a
decedent" it must be the result of activities of the decedent during
his lifetime and not the result of anything done by one taking from
the decedent.
In the recent case of Trust Company of Georgia v. Ross,24 the
decedent, prior to his death, entered into a contract to sell stock
and placed it in escrow. The government contended that the dif-
ference between thie decedent's cost and the sale pric of the stock
was income in respect of a decedent. The executor of the decedent's
estate contended that the amount in question was not due to the
activities of the decedent, but was rather the result of his own acti-
vities (which were performed subsequent to the decedent's death),
and that therefore the amount did not constitute income in respect
of a decedent.
The Fifth Circuit held that the decedent had entered into a
binding agreement before his death and that the amount in ques-
tion was the result of his activities, despite the fact that some
aspects of the transaction which the contract contemplated had to
be performed by the executor. The court held that the activities of
21 Levin v. United States, 373 F.2d 434, 437 (1st Cir. 1967).
22United States v. Ellis, 264 F.2d 325, 327 (2nd Cir. 1959).23 Rev. Rul. 60-227, 1960-1 Cum~. BuLL. 262.
24 Trust Co. of Georgia v. Ross, 392 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1967).
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the executor ". . . were not of such scope as would negate the right
which [the decedent had] under the contract.' '2 ' Thus, on the theory
that the decedent's activities had transformed the stock into a right
to income, the amount was ruled "income in respect of a decedent."
The Fifth Circuit, when making its decision, attempted to put
the requirement that income in respect of a decedent must be the result
of decedent's activities in proper perspective when it stated:
Although it is pertinent to inquire whether the income re-
ceived after death was attributable to activities and economic
efforts of the decedent in his lifetime, these activities and
efforts must give rise to a right to that income. And the right
is to be distinguished from the activity which creates the
rights. Absent such a right, no matter how great the activi-
ties or efforts, there would be no taxable income under
§ 69126
In the Ross case it was the sale of the stock which constituted
the activity giving rise to the right to income. In the Levin case it
was the loaning of money which constituted the activity giving rise
to the decedent's right to income. Although (unlike the Ross case)
nothing was required of Levin's executor, the court still refused to
hold that the entire discount income was income in respect of a
decedent. In so doing, the First Circuit has in effect stated that the
activity of the decedent gave him a right to income i.e., income in
respect of a decedent) and as of the moment of his death, the same
activity ceased ever to have created such a right. It is indeed dif-
ficult to understand how an act of the decedent can both "entitle"
and "not entitle" him to income. A logical extention of the "entitled
to income" concept upon which income in respect of a decedent is
based would result in a ruling that al the discount income (accruing
both before and after decedent's death) was the result of the decedent's
activities.
The only justification for what at first glance appears to be
rather faulty reasoning might be an attempt to avoid the harshness
which a strictly logical extension would yield. For example, assume
a situation involving a long term lease in which the lessor dies
shortly after entering into the agreement. In the absence of a deci-
sion such as that rendered by the First Circuit the entire amount
of rental income would constitute income in respect of a decedent.
In conclusion, although cases such as Levin result in what would ap-
year to be equitable outcomes, their lack of a clearly stated reason for
their decisions does little to eliminate the confusion surrounding the term
"income in respect of a decedent."
ROBERT G. FELKER
25Id. at 696.
261d. at 695.
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